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I study the welfare consequences of land use regulations for low- and high-skilled workers
within a city. I use detailed geographic data for Cook County and Chicago in 2015-2016,
together with a spatial quantitative model with two types of workers and real estate developers
who face regulations. For identification, I use the 1923 Zoning Ordinance, which was the first
comprehensive ordinance in Chicago. I find that an increase of 10 percentage points in the share
of residential zoning in a block group, relative to block groups with more commercial zoning,
leads to a 1.7% increase in housing prices, a 2.6% decrease in wages and a higher concentration
of high-skilled residents. Welfare changes can be decomposed into changes in housing prices,
sorting, wages and land rents. Results suggest that more mixed-use zoning and looser floor-to-
area limits lead to welfare improvements, especially for low-skilled residents, and to a reduction
in welfare inequality.
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1 Introduction
Regulations on the use of land are prevalent in almost every city in the modern world, and their
effects on housing prices (e.g., Glaeser et al. (2005)), housing supply (e.g., Saiz (2010)) and other
local outcomes (e.g., Saks (2008); Shertzer et al. (2018)) have been widely studied in the literature.1
Most of this research follows a reduced-form analysis and does not consider the general equilibrium
and welfare effects of land use regulations (LUR). These effects are relevant since LUR potentially
affects wages, amenities and household location choices through their effects on the residential and
commercial real estate markets. On the other hand, recent research by Allen et al. (2015) study
the general equilibrium and welfare effects of zoning, but does not provide well-identified treatment
effects and does not consider the distributional effects of these policies .
In this paper, I investigate the general equilibrium and distributional effects of zoning and floor-
to-area (FAR) restrictions within a city. In particular, I use a spatial quantitative model of a city,
together with well-identified reduced form estimates, to study the effects of these policies on real
estate prices, location choices and wages of low- and high-skilled workers, amenities, productivity,
land prices and welfare by skill type. Zoning and FAR restrictions are among the most popular
tools used by city governments to organize land use and economic activity. Specifically, zoning
specifies the permitted uses or activities inside a location, while FAR specifies the scale and volume
of these activities and is regarded as a good predictor for permitted building heights.
Among other results, I find that an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of residential
zoning in a block group leads to a 1.7% increase in housing prices, a 5.4% and 5.8% decrease in the
wages of high-skilled and low-skilled workers, respectively, and a 5.1% decrease in local productivity.
On the other hand, an equivalent increase in the share of mixed-use designations leads to a decrease
of 5.4% in housing prices, a lower concentration of high-skilled residents, a 2.6% increase in wages
for both types of workers and a similar increase in local productivity. Relaxing FAR limits in a
location leads to lower housing prices and amenities, higher wages and productivity, and a higher
concentration of low-skill workers.
1I am not aware of any large city without land use regulations. Even Houston, which is well-known for not having a
comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, uses other tools, such as restrictive covenants and deed restrictions (Siegan, 1970).
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Since zoning and FAR restrictions affect sorting patterns and skill-specific wages, my findings
highlight the importance of including worker heterogeneity when studying the effects of LUR. In this
paper, I focus on the distinction between high- and low-skilled workers, which differ in at least three
dimensions. First, there are significant differences in real wages between both skill types within and
across urban areas (Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2013; Moretti, 2013). Second, low-income households
spend a higher share of their income on housing (Notowidigdo, 2019). Since low-skilled workers
are more likely to earn low wages relative to high-skilled workers (Mincer, 1974), higher housing
expenditure shares make them more susceptible to changes in housing prices. Third, high-income
workers have a higher opportunity cost of commuting time (Wheaton, 1977). These differences
affect the location choices of both types of workers and how they react to changes in LUR.
To study these issues, I collect detailed geographic data for Cook County and the City of Chicago
for 2015-2016. These data include the universe of real estate transactions from Zillow (2017) and
the geographic distribution of zoning districts within Chicago. Using these data, I build residential
and commercial real estate price indices and different measures of LUR at the Census block group
level. I complement these data with data containing commuting flows and counts of people by
education category at the block level, and with Cook County’s Land Use Inventory CMAP (2016).
The real estate data show that residential and commercial prices are significantly different in more
than 90% of the block groups in the city. These price gaps indicate the existence of inefficiencies in
the real estate market and a potential welfare-improving role of changes in the zoning ordinance.
Identification of causal effects of LUR is cumbersome given the endogeneity of zoning and FAR
regulations. For instance, low-density zoning is more likely to happen in neighborhoods with a
larger share of high-income population (Fischel, 2001), with more desirable amenities (Hilber and
Robert-Nicoud, 2013), or facing a lower demand for floor space (Wallace, 1988). I tackle these issues
using an instrumental variables approach, in which I instrument current regulations with the 1923
Chicago Zoning Ordinance. This ordinance was the first comprehensive zoning ordinance adopted
in Chicago. In particular, Shertzer et al. (2018) show that the 1923 Zoning Ordinance is a good
predictor of current zoning and current land uses. Following Shertzer et al. (2016a), who show that
1923 neighborhood demographic and geographic characteristic had an effect on the initial zoning
ordinance, I include in my analysis a large set of historical covariates.
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Afterward, I present a quantitative model of a city that builds on Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). Contrary
to their model, I introduce two types of workers: low- and high-skilled, who differ in their income
and housing expenditures. Moreover, in the spirit of Muth (1969) and Fujita and Ogawa (1982),
my model includes the microfoundations of a real estate market in which developers supply both
residential and commercial floor space subject to zoning and FAR restrictions. The inclusion of
developers and LUR into a spatial quantitative model constitutes an important contribution of my
paper. From the model, changes in welfare given by a change in LUR can be decomposed as the
sum of four effects: (i) changes in housing prices, (ii) changes in skill-specific amenities coming
from sorting, (iii) changes in wages and market access, and (iv) changes in the income coming from
the rents of land.
Using this model, I follow the methodologies proposed by Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Tsivanidis
(2019) to recover block group measures of wages, amenities and productivity, given observed data
and values for the model’s parameters. Moreover, I lay out a solution for the equilibrium of the
real estate market. The proposed solution lets me recover land prices and the shadow price of FAR
regulations at the block group level. After recovering these unobservables, I study how zoning and
FAR restrictions affect them. Following the instrumental variables approach, I find that tighter
regulations in a block group lead to lower local wages. n particular, a 10 percentage points increase
in the share of residential zoning, relative to block groups with more commercial zoning, leads to a
decrease of 5.8% in the wage of low-skilled workers and of 5.4% in the wage of high-skilled workers.
The effect on wages of a one-unit decrease in FAR limits is a decrease of 19% for both types of
residents. These lower wages are compensated by increases in amenities of around 2.5% and 3%
for the respective policies. However, these policies also have a significantly negative effect on local
productivity of 5% and 18%, respectively.
Finally, counterfactual exercises suggest an important role of changes in the zoning code for
improving welfare and decreasing inequality. In particular, I simulate the effects of four policies.
First, a policy that allows more residential zoning in block groups displaying an excess relative
supply of commercial real estate, and vice versa. Second, a policy that increases the FAR limit by
0.5 in those blocks where the constraint is the most stringent. Third, a policy that sets a minimum
FAR of 1.2 everywhere in Chicago. Fourth, a policy that sets a minimum of land zoned for mixed-
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uses at 25% in each block group. All of these policies lead to similar welfare improvements for
low-skilled residents, and to a decrease in the welfare gap between skill types. These quantitative
exercises also suggest that the current zoning ordinance is a regressive policy that benefits high-
skilled residents more, but that it can be modified to reduce welfare inequality.
This paper is related to the literature studying the effects of LUR.2 Theoretically, Helsley
and Strange (1995) and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) explore some welfare effects of LUR. Empirically,
most of the literature agrees that LUR leads to i) higher land and housing values, and to a more
inelastic supply of floor space (Mayer and Somerville, 2000; McMillen and McDonald, 2002; Glaeser
et al., 2005; Glaeser and Ward, 2009); and ii) to decreases in total welfare, with potentially large
distributional impacts (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002; Turner et al., 2014; Hsieh and Moretti, 2015).
My paper also relates to research studying zoning in Chicago and the 1923 Zoning Ordinance
(McMillen and McDonald, 2002; Zhou et al., 2008; Shertzer et al., 2016a, 2018). In particular,
Shertzer et al. (2018) conclude that zoning in Chicago has been more important than geography or
transportation networks determining the distribution of economic activity. My paper contributes
to this literature by providing a general equilibrium evaluation of LUR. Specifically, by studying
the effects of zoning and FAR on a wide range of outcomes—i.e., housing and land prices, wages,
productivity, sorting and welfare—, I include in one single framework the effects of these policies.
This paper also relates to the articles that explore heterogeneous effects of LUR. In particular,
Kahn et al. (2010) and Levine (1999) find that areas with more low-density zoning experience
more gentrification, affecting mostly minorities and low-income households. Muehlegger and Shoag
(2015) show that tighter LUR are associated with increases in commuting time, especially for
more educated and wealthier individuals. Ganong and Shoag (2017) find that stringent LUR in
productive cities has caused a decrease in the returns to living in these cities for low-skilled people,
but have remained constant for high-skilled. My paper contributes to this literature in three ways.
First, by analyzing the impact of LUR on the distribution of skills across locations within a city.
Second, by disentangling the effects that zoning and FAR restrictions have on wages and welfare
by skill type. Third, by contributing to the debate on whether zoning is a regressive measure,
benefiting high-skilled people more.
2Fischel (2015) and Gyourko and Molloy (2015) provide superb summaries about the recent state of the literature.
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Furthermore, my paper is part of a recent literature using quantitative models in urban eco-
nomics such as Ahlfeldt et al. (2015); Allen et al. (2015); Tsivanidis (2019); Baum-Snow and Han
(2019), among others. There are three important departures of my model with respect to the stan-
dard models. First, similar to Tsivanidis (2019), my model includes worker heterogeneity, which
is important given the potential distributional impacts of LUR. Second, my model includes micro-
foundations for the supply of real estate supply into this quantitative setting. Third, I decompose
changes in welfare in changes in rent, wages, sorting and income from land rents, to study the
specific mechanisms through which LUR affects residents.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I describe my data sources. In Section 3, I briefly
discuss the 1923 Zoning Ordinance and study the relationship between LUR, real estate prices and
sorting by skill. Section 4 presents the quantitative model with heterogeneous workers and LUR.
Section 5 exploits the recursive structure of the model in order to solve the model, given some
data and values for different parameters. In Section 6, I explore the effect of zoning and FAR
restrictions on wages, amenities, productivity, and land prices. In this section, I also present the
policy counterfactuals that show how changes in LUR can lead to reductions in welfare inequality.
The final section concludes and highlights directions for future research.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In order to investigate the effects of zoning and FAR restrictions on real estate prices, sorting and
wages across locations, I combine data from five sources. First, data on workplace and residence
area characteristics from the US Census Bureau. Second, data from Zillow Economic Research
containing the universe of real estate transactions. The LODES and Zillow data are available
for any city in the country. The main challenge constitutes finding a city with detailed data on
LUR. Fortunately, the Data Portal of the City of Chicago contains a database with all the zoning
districts within city boundaries, which I complement with a Land Use Inventory for the rest of
Cook County. Finally, I use historical zoning, demographic and geographic variables for Chicago
in the 1920s, collected and studied by Shertzer et al. (2016a), Shertzer et al. (2016b) and Shertzer
et al. (2018). In the rest of this section, I describe these data and present descriptive statistics.
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2.1 Real Estate Prices
I use data of real estate prices and stocks from Zillow Economic Research for Cook County in
2015 and 2016. The Zillow ZTRAX data are constructed from information in local deed transfers
and mortgages for mostly residential properties, but also include commercial properties in the more
recent years.(Zillow, 2017).3 Among other variables, these data include sales price, transaction date
and coordinates of the property. I merge this dataset with their assessment data, which include
property characteristics, geographic information, current and prior valuations.
Using the ZTRAX transactions and assessment data, I build quality-adjusted residential and
commercial real estate price indices for each census block group in Cook County for 2015-2016
using a hedonic regression approach.4 Further details regarding the construction of these indices
can be found in Appendix A.1. The estimated residential price index covers around 97% of all
block groups in my sample, while the commercial price index has a coverage of 43%. To increase
coverage, I use an inverse distance weighted interpolation for those block groups with missing price
indices. For those blocks where missing values persists, I use the mean within the block group’s
census tract. These imputations raise the coverage of the residential and commercial price indices
to 99.9% and to 97.5%, respectively. Since these prices are identified up to scale, I normalize their
geometric mean to 1. Figure A1 presents the distribution of real estate prices across block groups
in Cook County, and Table A1 presents descriptive statistics.
There is significant variation between residential and commercial real estate prices across loca-
tions. On average, residential real estate is more expensive than commercial, but 5.4% of the block
groups have commercial real estate more expensive than any block group’s housing. Moreover, the
data show that residential prices are higher than commercial prices in around 45% of the block
groups, commercial is more expensive than residential in 46%, and only in around 8% the ratio lies
between 0.9 and 1.1. The existence of these price gaps is interesting from a theoretical perspective
since canonical models of real estate supply suggest that developers provide both residential and
3Data provided by Zillow through the Zillow Transaction and Assessment Dataset (ZTRAX). More information
on accessing the data can be found at http://www.zillow.com/ztrax. The results and opinions are those of the author
and do not reflect the position of Zillow Group.
4A block group is the US Census classification lying between a tract and a block. There are 809 tracts in Chicago
containing on average 2.7 block groups, and there are 2,194 block groups containing on average 17 blocks.
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commercial floor space until their price equalize. Therefore, these gaps indicate the existence of
inefficiencies in the real estate market, and a potential role for changes in LUR to solve them.
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of such gaps.
Figure 1: Real Estate Price Gap (Residential/Commercial)–Cook County, 2015-2016
This figure shows the ratio between residential and commercial real estate price indices for every block group in Cook
County for 2015-2016. These prices are estimated using a hedonic regression approach for both types of properties,
separately, and an inverse distance weighted interpolation for those locations without enough observations. Red block
groups are those where residential prices are at least 10% higher than commercial prices. Blue block groups are those
where commercial prices are at least 10% higher than residential prices. Yellow block groups are those where prices
are in the interval between the previous categories. Green dot represents Chicago’s CBD.
Finally, I use the assessment data to measure the stock of residential and commercial floor space
in each block group as the sum of the built square footage of all properties within type. Figure A2
shows that the block groups with the largest stock of residential space are located downtown and
in the suburbs, while the stock of commercial real estate is concentrated downtown, along the main
avenues and in the suburbs.
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2.2 Land Use Regulations
The data on land use and its regulations comes from two sources. First, from the Data Portal
of the City of Chicago, which contains a geographic database of all the zoning districts within
city boundaries. Second, from the 2015 Land Use Inventory for Cook County, which is built and
published by the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP).
The zoning data contain the polygons and specific zone class categories in 2016. The detailed
specifications of each zone class are available in the Chicago Zoning and Land Use Ordinances (City
of Chicago, 2019). In total, there are 66 zone classes, 15 Planned Manufacturing Developments
(PMD) and more than a thousand Planned Developments (PD) within the city. Out of the total
land area in Chicago, around 52% is currently categorized as residential (R), while manufacturing
(M), commercial (C) and business (B) districts use approximately 11%, 3% and 7%, respectively.
Locations categorized as downtown districts (D) use about 1% of the area.5 PMD and PD cover
6% and 12%, respectively. Further details of this database can be found in Appendix A.2.
I group all districts into three categories: those designated for residential purposes only, for
commercial only and for mixed-uses. I also categorize each Planned Development into a category
based on their characteristics.6 In the left panel of Figure 2, I present a map of Chicago using
this categorization. The land that can be used by firms only (red) is spread along and around the
main highways and waterways, while mixed-use areas (purple) are located mainly downtown and
along the main streets. Areas designated for residential purposes only (blue) are located mainly
in neighborhoods surrounded by mixed-use areas. In the right panel, I map the maximum FAR
allowed in each zoning district. High density (red and pink) is allowed mostly downtown and in
some parts of the coast; medium density (greens) is allowed along the coast of Lake Michigan and
in the areas where only commercial uses are allowed; low density (blues) is allowed particularly in
residential zoned areas.7
Using these maps, I build block group measures of the share of land designated for residential,
5Downtown districts can be Residential (DR), Core (DC), Service (DS) or Mixed-Use (DX) districts.
6Planned Developments correspond to tall buildings and other large developments in which developers must work
with the City to ensure that the project integrates with surrounding neighborhoods (2nd City Zoning, nd). The City
of Chicago keeps pdf files for each Planned Development in https://gisapps.chicago.gov/gisimages/zoning˙pds.
7In Figure A3, I present a map of the distribution of all nine broad zoning designations.
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Figure 2: Land Use Regulations in Chicago
Notes: This figure shows two current land use regulations in the City of Chicago. The left map presents the
areas where only commercial (red), residential (blue) or mixed-uses (purple) are allowed. The right panel shows
the maximum FAR allowed in each zoning district, where reds denote high allowed density, greens denote medium
allowed density, and blues denote low allowed density.
mixed-uses or commercial purposes, and the average allowed FAR. I also build a measure of the
share of residential floor space allowed in each block group and denote it as λ.8 This measure is
used for solving the model as it captures the share of floor space in mixed-use districts that can be
used for housing.
The zoning data is only available for the City of Chicago, which contains around 35% of the
residents of its metropolitan area. Ignoring land uses outside the city might render an incomplete
picture of the effects of LUR on the distribution of economic activity in this labor market. For
this reason, I include data on the use of land in the rest of Cook County from the 2015 Land Use
8For example, B3-3 zoning districts have an allowed FAR of 3, with apartments only permitted above the ground
floor. In this case, I assume that the first floor is used for commercial purposes, while the two remaining floors are
used for residential purposes. Hence, I set λ = 2/3. Moreover, λ = 1 for residential-only districts, and λ = 0 for
commercial-only districts.
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Inventory. This inventory contains the specific uses of land in all Northeastern Illinois and is built
to develop long-range population and employment forecasts that support Chicago Metropolitan
Agency’s planning strategies (CMAP, 2016). Using these data, I build measures of the share of
land area used for residential, mixed-uses or commercial purposes in each block group outside the
City.
In Table 1, I present descriptive statistics of the different measures of zoning across block groups
in Cook County. The average block group has 75% of its land zoned for residential purposes, 15%
for commercial purposes and 10% for mixed-uses. The average allowed FAR is 1.8. Furthermore,
out of the 10% zoned for mixed-uses, around 77% of it can be used for housing. Compared to the
average, the median block group is more residential and has lower FAR. In fact, 75% of the block
groups in the city have an average allowed FAR of less than two.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Zoning Measures
Mean SD Min p25 p50 p75 max
Sh. Res. Only 0.75 0.24 0 0.66 0.83 0.93 1
Sh. Mixed-uses 0.10 0.15 0 0 0.02 0.14 1
Sh. Firm Only 0.15 0.21 0 0 0.06 0.21 1
Mean FAR 1.82 1.60 0.5 0.94 1.24 2.01 14.2
Sh. Res. Space Allowed 0.77 0.22 0 0.70 0.85 0.92 1
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for different measures of land use regulations across block groups for
Cook County in 2016.
For my empirical strategy, I also use the 1923 Zoning Ordinance together with a large set of
demographic and geographic characteristics from the early 1920’s. The 1923 zoning data was digi-
tized by Allison Shertzer, Tate Twinam and Randall Walsh, who provided me with the shapefiles
containing the four use-districts and the five volume-districts used in this ordinance. I provide fur-
ther details of this Ordinance in Section 3.1. Moreover, I use different demographic and geographic
data from the 1920 census, which is provided in the supplementary material from Shertzer et al.
(2016a). The authors collect these data at the enumeration district level from a variety of sources,
including Ancestry.com, National Archives and the 1922 Chicago Land Use Survey.
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2.3 Distribution of Skills and Commuting
For data on population by workplace and residential areas, I use version 7.2 of the US Census Bureau
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Origin-Destination Employment Statistics
(LODES) for 2015 and 2016. The LODES data contain information about the location of jobs and
residences as provided by state unemployment insurance and federal worker earning records. These
data contain counts of the people living and working in each census block. This information can
be further split by earnings categories or educational attainment. The LODES data also contain
the number of commuters between every pair of blocks, which can only be separated by age and
earnings categories.
Out of the total working population of age 30 or older in Cook County in 2015-2016, 14% had
less than a high school degree, 23% had a high school degree only, 30% had a college or an associate
degree, and 33% had a bachelors or an advanced degree. I categorize as low-skilled those workers
within the first two categories. Table A2 presents the number of residents and workers by education
category in the mean and median block group. These statistics show that the distribution of workers
across block groups is more skewed than the distribution of residents. Figure A4 presents the share
of high-skilled people for every block group of residence and of work in the county. These maps
show a high concentration of high-skilled residents, especially in the downtown area and north of
it. Low-skilled residents are concentrated in the south and west portions of the county.
The LODES data also contain for each block the number of workers by skill type for three
earnings categories: less than $1250/month, $1250/month to $3333/month, and greater than
$3333/month. I define as high-wage those workers within the top category and calculate the share
of low- and high-wage workers by skill.9 Under this definition, approximately 37% of workers in
Cook county are in the high-skilled high-wage category, while 25% are in the low-skilled low-wage
category. Table A3 presents these shares.
9According to the American Community Survey (ACS), out of the full-time year-round workers with positive
earnings, approximately 4.7% makes less than $1250 each month, 34.5% earns between $1251 and $3333, and 60.8%
makes more than $3333 a month.
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3 Land Use Regulations, Prices and the Distribution of Skills
In this section, I explore the effects of zoning and FAR restrictions on the distribution of real
estate prices, wages and people by skill across block groups. Real estate prices and wages are
relevant outcomes since they affect households’ expenditures and income, and potentially welfare.
In addition, the distribution of people by skill across locations is relevant as local amenities and
productivity tend to respond positively to higher population density. Moreover, if each block group
is considered to be a small open economy, the spatial concentration of residents could be a rough
measure of local welfare. In order to identify the effects of current regulations, I use the 1923
Chicago Zoning Ordinance, together with an instrumental variables approach. I start by briefly
describing this ordinance, but the reader should refer to Shertzer et al. (2016a) and Shertzer et al.
(2018) for more detailed information.
3.1 The 1923 Chicago Zoning Ordinance
There are at least three threats to causal identification of the effects of land use regulations on the
spatial distribution of economic activity. First, low-density zoning is more likely in neighborhoods
with a larger share of high-income population. Since richer households are more likely to own
properties, if LUR leads to higher housing prices owners may want to strengthen the regulations
to increase the value of their homes. This phenomenon is known as the Homevoter Hypothesis
(Fischel, 2001; Parkhomenko, 2020). Second, locations with more desirable amenities (such as
parks, lakes or historical buildings) might have tighter LUR to prevent developments around these
areas (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013). Third, changes in zoning could be caused by changes in
the demand for certain locations (Wallace, 1988).
I tackle these issues by instrumenting current LUR using the 1923 Chicago zoning ordinance,
which was the first comprehensive zoning ordinance adopted in Chicago. Even though Chicago’s
city government had made previous attempts to control undesirable land uses, these approaches
were insufficient to meet public demand in a constantly growing city. Therefore, in 1921 the local
government created a Zoning Commission, which spent 18 months surveying existing land uses and
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organizing public hearings, until the final ordinance was adopted in 1923. The ordinance regulated
land by restricting allowed uses and building volumes: it included four use districts (single-family
residential, multi-family residential, commercial and manufacturing), and five volume districts, that
imposed restrictions on height and lot coverage.10 Figure 3 shows the distribution of use and volume
districts according to the 1923 zoning ordinance, which, according to. Shertzer et al. (2018), are a
good predictor of current LUR.
Figure 3: 1923 Chicago Zoning Ordinance
Notes: This figure the distribution of use and volumn districts given by the 1923 Chicago Zoning Ordinance. The left
map presents the four use districts: single-family residential, multi-family residential, commercial and manufacturing.
The right map presents the five volume districts.
Using the use and volume districts from the 1923 zoning ordinance, I build block group level
measures of the share of each district. I use these shares as instruments for 2016 LUR following
this specification:
LUR2016,i = πZoning1923,i + ψXi + εi (1)
10Use districts were hierarchical, which means that multi-family districts allowed single-family residences, commer-
cial districts allowed multi- and single-family residences, and manufacturing districts allowed any use.
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where LUR2016,i corresponds to one of the block group level measures of LUR in 2016 presented in
Table 1; Zoning1923,i is a vector that includes the 1923 shares of land designated as manufacturing
or commercial (single- and multi-family residential are the omitted categories), and as volume
districts 1, 2 or 3 (volume districts 4 and 5 are the omitted categories); Xi is a vector of control
variables at the block group level, which includes total land area, interactions between distance to
the CBD and the closest body of water,11, a transit accessibility index,12 1927-wards fixed effects,
and a set of 1922 neighboorhood demographic and land use characteristics.13 This large set of
controls and fixed effects implies that I am comparing highly similar block groups inside 1927-
wards, thus, I am using rather local variation to identify the causal effects of zoning and FAR
restrictions. Demographic and economic characteristics are available for around 67% of the block
groups within Chicago. Therefore, identification of my estimates come from the impact of these
regulations in this portion of the city. Nonetheless, the quantitative exercises from Sections 5 and
6.4 use data for the entire county.
Finally, εi corresponds to the error term. All of the regressions include spatial heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent (SHAC) standard errors (Conley, 1999). Specifically, I use the
routine developed by Hsiang (2010) with a linear Bartlett window. I calibrate the distance cutoff
of the spatial kernel to 1.5 km based on results derived from bootstrapping the spatial correlation
between residual real estate prices. I present these results in Figure A5 and show that the residual
covariance between real estate prices is almost zero among block groups located 1.25 and 1.75km
away, for residential and commercial real estate prices, respectively.
I present the estimation results from equation (1) in Table 2. Columns (1)-(2) use as dependent
variables the share of land where only residential or mixed-uses are allowed. Results from these
columns are similar to those from Table A.4 in Shertzer et al. (2018): block groups with a higher
11Including Lake Michigan, Chicago River (south and north branches), Des Plaines River, Little Calumet River,
and a small number of large lakes within city boundaries.
12The raster map used to compute this index was provided by Tate Twinam, who obtained it from
www.walkscore.com.
13I use the same set of control variables from Shertzer et al. (2016a) and Shertzer et al. (2018). These controls
are: percent of northern- or southern-born black population; percentage of first- or second immigration immigrants;
population density; maids per household; indicator for presence and distance to a major street, coast, main or ancillary
railroads, and Union Stockyards; number of warehouses; indicator and density of commercial uses, manufacturing
uses, 4,...,10,11-25 story buildings; number of manufacturing uses within 500ft and between 500ft and 1000ft; indicator
for alderman living in district; 1913 land values.
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share of land designated for manufacturing and/or commercial purposes in the 1923 ordinance have
a larger share of land zoned for residential-only uses in 2016, relative to similar and nearby block
groups with a lower share of these designations. Moreover, these blocks have a higher share of land
zoned for mixed-uses. Column (3) shows that block groups with a higher share of land designated
for manufacturing and/or commercial purposes in the 1923 ordinance have high allowed FAR today.
Regarding volume, a larger share of low volume districts in 1923 is associated with lower FAR limits
in 2016, relative to block groups with a larger share of high volume districts in 1923.
Table 2: First Stage Regressions: 2016 Zoning as a Function of 1923 Zoning
(1) (2) (3)
Sh. Only Sh. Mixed Mean
1923 / 2016 Residential Uses FAR
Share Commercial -0.37*** 0.41*** 0.51***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share Manufacture -0.44*** 0.03*** 1.09***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share Volume 1 -0.13*** 0.11*** -1.83***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share Volume 2 -0.15*** 0.12*** -1.57***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share Volume 3 -0.13*** 0.07*** -1.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R-squared 0.96 0.80 0.93
Notes: This table shows the results of regressions of 2016 measures of land use regulations as function of the share
of allowed uses and volumes given by the 1923 Chicago Zoning Ordinance. These measures are constructed at the
block group level. Omitted 1923 zoning types are residential uses and volume districts 4 and 5. (1)-(2) correspond to
the share of land in districts where only residences or mixed-uses are allowed, respectively. The share of land where
only firms are allowed is the omitted category. (3) corresponds to the mean FAR. Number of block groups is 1,427.
Spatial Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (SHAC) standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999);
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.2 LUR and the Real Estate Market
Using the previous identification strategy, I explore the effects of current regulations on the real
estate market by estimating the following regression:
ln(rT i) = β1LUR2016,i + ψ1Xi + ε1,i, (2)
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where ln(rT i) corresponds to the quality-adjusted price index for type T properties (residential
or commercial) in block group i; LUR2016,i corresponds to one of the measures for current LUR;
Xi denotes the set of control variables described in equation (1); ε1i is the error term. The OLS
estimates from equation (2)–which are presented in Table A4–show a non-significant relationship
between LUR and real estate prices. As discussed previously, these estimates could be biased
since homeowners in locations with high housing prices may lobby for more stringent regulation to
maintain high prices.
Therefore, I estimate equation (2) using two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the first stages
are given by equation (1). Identification under this strategy requires that historical LUR only affect
real estate prices through their impact on current LUR, once controlling for the set of historical and
geographic characteristics. Ward fixed effects and controls imply that the estimates from my 2SLS
regressions are identified using within-wards variation, comparing block groups that were similar
in terms of 1920 demographic and current geographic characteristics, but differ in their current
regulations.
Table 3 presents the results of these regressions. Estimates from Panel A suggest that block
groups with a larger share of area designated for residential uses have higher residential prices and
built area. In particular, an increase of 10 percentage points (pp) in the share of residential-only
area (e.g., going from the median to the 75th percentile block group) leads to a 1.7% increase in the
average price of housing, relative to block groups with more commercial-only designations. This
increase also leads to a 3.5% increase in the price of commercial real estate. A similar increase in
the share of mixed-use zoning leads to reductions of 5.4% and 4.6% in residential and commercial
prices, respectively. In Panel B, I show that a one-unit increase in the mean allowed FAR leads to
a decrease of 2% in housing prices, but a 5% increase in the price for commercial real estate. The
weak effect of more relaxed FAR on housing prices can be driven by two effects: an increase in the
stock of floor space (as suggested by Column 2), together with a potential increase in population
density, which could lead to more amenities. The positive effect for commercial prices could be
driven by increases in productivity brought by a higher density of workers and businesses.
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Table 3: Effects of LUR on the Real Estate Market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Price Ln Stock Ln Price Ln Stock
Type Residential Commercial
Panel A
Sh. Res. Only 0.17*** 1.11*** 0.33*** -2.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sh. Mixed-uses -0.56*** 0.66*** -0.48*** 12.91***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
F-Test 13.09 11.86 15.31 11.86
Panel B
Mean FAR -0.02*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 0.97***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
F-Test 20.06 18.61 20.59 18.61
Observations 1,424 1,421 1,376 1,421
Notes: This table shows the results of 2SLS regressions of the effects of different LUR measures on prices and stock
in the real estate market. The estimations use the 1923 zoning ordinance as instrument and include controls for
block group’s land area, distance to the CBD and to major waterways, transit access, and historical covariates. Price
measures are quality adjusted (hedonic) and are defined in Section 2.1. Spatial Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation
Consistent (SHAC) standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p. <0.1.
3.3 LUR and the Spatial Distribution of Skills and Wages
In this subsection, I explore the effects of current LUR on the distribution of high- and low-skilled
workers within and across block groups. I do this by estimating the following regressions:
ln(Skillsi) = β2LUR2016,i + ψ2Xi + ε2,i, (3)
where Skillsi denotes one of the following measures of skill composition of block group i: (i) the
share of high-skilled people (hi) inside the block group (hi/(hi + li)), where li denotes the number
of low-skilled people; (ii) the number of high-skilled people in the block group relative to the city
total (hi/
∑
j hj), and (iii) the number of low-skilled people in a block group relative to the city
total (li/
∑
j lj). The first measure captures the skill composition of a given block group, while the
latter two capture the spatial concentration of a particular skill type. I compute these measures
for block groups of residence and work, separately, and present their respective regression results
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in Columns (1)-(3) and Columns (4)-(6) from Table 4.14
The results from Panel A suggest that, a 10pp increase in the share of land zoned for residential-
only uses leads to a small (but significant) increase of 0.2% in the share of high-skilled residents,
relative to block groups with more land zone as commercial-only. Estimates in columns (2) and
(3) suggest that more residential zoning also leads to more spatial concentration of both types of
residents relative to every other block group in the city. On the other hand, a 10pp increase in
the share of land zoned for mixed-uses in a block group, leads to a decrease of 1% in the share
of high-skilled residents. This change in skill composition comes from an increase of 8.3% in the
spatial concentration of low-skilled residents inside the block group, relative to an increase of 6.4%
in the spatial concentration of high-skilled residents. Columns (5) and (6) show that increases in
mixed-use zoning lead to increases in the spatial concentration of both types of workers.
Regarding FAR, Panel B shows that a one-unit increase in the allowed FAR leads to spatial
decentralization of residents and to a spatial concentration of workers, especially low-skilled. In
particular, a one-unit increase in the allowed FAR leads to 78% and 92% increases in the relative
spatial concentration of high-skilled and low-skilled workers, respectively. This result suggests that
higher FAR is associated with more mixed-use or commercial zoning, relative to residential.
Finally, I investigate the effect of current LUR on the distribution of wages for both types of
workers estimating the following regressions:
ShLowWagee,i = β3LUR2016,i + ψ3Xi + ε3,i, (4)
where ShLowWagee,i denotes the share of low wage workers from skill type e in block group i.
Columns (1) and (2) from Table 5 presents the results of these regressions for low- and high-skilled
workers, respectively.
Results from Panel A suggest that block groups with a higher share of area zoned for residential
or mixed-uses have a higher share of low-wage workers, both low- and high-skilled. In particular, a
14Not controlling for the endogeneity of LUR could also lead to biased coefficients in these regressions, since
locations with a larger share of high-skilled and high-income residents may have more influential groups lobbying for
more stringent regulation. Columns (5)-(10) from Table A4 confirms the existence of these biases.
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Table 4: Effects of LUR on the Distribution of Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sh. High Sh. Low Sh. High Sh. High Sh. Low Sh. High
Skilled (w) Skilled (a) Skilled (a) Skilled (w) Skilled (a) Skilled (a)
Block Type Residence Work
Panel A
Sh. Res Only 0.02*** 0.98*** 1.06*** 0.10*** -2.91*** -2.36***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sh. Mixed-uses -0.10*** 0.80*** 0.62*** -0.03*** 0.95*** 1.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
F-Test 11.77 12.89 12.89 12.21 12.89 12.89
Panel B
Mean FAR 0.00*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.04*** 0.92*** 0.78***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
F-Test 19.04 20.42 20.42 20.82 20.42 20.42
Observations 1,423 1,427 1,427 1,389 1,427 1,427
Notes: This table shows the results of 2SLS regressions of the effects of different LUR measures on the spatial
distribution of high- and low-skilled workers within and across block groups of residence (Columns 1-3) and work
(4-6). The estimations use the 1923 zoning ordinance as instrument and include controls for block group’s land area,
distance to the CBD and to major waterways, transit access, and historical covariates. Dependent variables are in
logs; (w) denotes the share within block group (e.g., high-skilled as proportion to the block group’s population);
(a) denotes the share across blocks (e.g., high-skilled in a block group relative to the total high-skilled in the city).
Spatial Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (SHAC) standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999);
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p. <0.1.
10pp increase in the share of residential zoning leads to an increase in the share of low-wage workers
of 3.9% for low-skilled, and 5.4% for high-skilled. For a 10pp increase in the share of mixed-use
land, the shares increase by 4.3% and 3.1%, respectively. Similarly, results from Panel B suggest
that tighter FAR limits lead to a higher share of low-wage workers: a 10% increase for low-skilled
and a 18% increase for high-skilled workers, after a one-unit decrease in the allowed FAR.
Recall from Table 3 that more stringent LUR lead to higher commercial real estate prices.
These results together imply that, firms adjust to higher real estate prices by offering lower wages.
Alternatively, these results could also suggest that low-wage firms (or sectors) sort into more res-
idential areas, while high-wages firms into locations where taller buildings are allowed. I expand
the analysis of the effect of LUR on wages in Section 6 using a model-recovered measure of wages.
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Table 5: Effects of LUR on Wages
(1) (2)
Sh. Low Wage
Skill Cat. Low High
Panel A
Sh. Res. Only 0.38*** 0.54***
(0.00) (0.00)








Notes: This table shows the results of 2SLS regressions of the effects of different LUR measures on the log share of
low wage workers by skill type. The estimations use the 1923 zoning ordinance as instrument and include controls
for block group’s land area, distance to the CBD and to major waterways, transit access, and historical covariates.
Spatial Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999); ** p<0.05,
* p. <0.1.
4 A Quantitative Model of a City
The empirical results presented in Section 3 suggest that more residential zoning and tighter FAR
limits in a location lead to higher housing prices and lower wages. Moreover, locations with a higher
share of land zone for mixed-uses have cheaper housing and a larger concentration of low-skilled
workers. In this section, I develop a spatial equilibrium model of a city, which will allow me to study
the mechanisms driving the previous results and the effect of LUR in other unobserved outcomes,
such as amenities, land prices, and welfare.
In this model, individuals—who are high- or low-skilled—choose where to live and work, and
their consumption of goods and floor space. Both types differ in their total income and the fraction
of it spent on housing. Firms choose the number of each type of workers and the amount of
floor space for production. This part of the model builds mainly on Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), but
also draws some elements from Diamond (2016) and Tsivanidis (2019). In a second part, I add
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microfoundations for the real estate market by modelling real estate developers who face LUR and
choose the supply of real estate subject to these regulations.
Consider a closed city consisting of a set {1, 2, ..., L} of block groups, each with a total land
area of Li. The closed-city assumption implies that the city-wide population of each skill group is
exogenous, but the expected utility is endogenously determined. Block groups differ in terms of
final good productivity, residential amenities and their access to the rest of the city. Throughout
this section, residence locations are indexed with i or m, and work locations with j or n.
4.1 Individuals
There are two types of people: high-(s) and low-skilled (u), with a fixed total population of Ns and
Nu, respectively. Both types receive income from their labor and rents from land, which are paid
to every individual in the city. Individuals are indexed by o and are endowed with one-unit of labor
that is supplied inelastically. Every worker o of type e ∈ {s, u} living in location i and working in















where Bei denotes skill-specific residential amenities and reflect the average preference of living in i
by type e residents; hRio and cio represent the amount of housing and final good demanded by worker
o living in block group i. Commuting costs act as a dispersion force, reducing the productivity
and wages at work. I assume these costs take an iceberg form dij = e
κτij ≥ 1, where τij ∈ [0,∞)
represents travel time between two locations and κ represents the incidence of these commuting
costs. In addition, individuals receive productivity shocks over workplace locations (εjeo) and
preference shocks over residential locations (vieo), which differ by skill-type. Furthermore, I assume
βs ≥ βu following recent literature showing that low-skilled spend a higher share of their income
on housing relative to high-skilled people (Notowidigdo, 2019; Ganong and Shoag, 2017).
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In the budget constraint, the price of consumption goods is the same across locations and is
normalized to one; and rRi is the price of housing in location i. In this model, all land is owned
by people. Therefore, total income comes from their commuting-discounted wage wej/dij , plus a
transfer (ϕe), which represents the payments received by households from the rents of land. These
transfers do not vary across space and are the same for all residents within skill type. I assume
that these payments are larger for high-skilled residents (ϕs > ϕu).
15 The sum of these payments
across all workers must equal total land rents, R =
∑L
i (piLi), where pi denotes the price of the
land in location i.
From the solution of the maximization problem in equation (6), I obtain an expression for the








Given this indirect utility, individuals first choose where to live and then where to work. For the
second stage, assume that type e residents from location i draw a vector of iid match-productivities
over workplace locations from a Fréchet distribution with cdf F (εje) = exp{−Teε−θeje }. The scale
parameter Te determines the average productivity of type e workers and θe > 1 the dispersion of
worker productivity within type, with a higher θe implying a lower degree of unobserved hetero-
geneity. Residents choose the work location that offers the highest commuting-discounted wage:
maxj{wejεjeo/dij}. Properties of the Fréchet distribution imply that the probability of a type-e















This probability depends positively on the wage offered in that location net of commuting costs,
relative to all other locations. Differences in the dispersion parameters θs and θu determine differ-
ences in the incidence of commuting costs across skill groups. In addition, RMAei denotes block






This measure summarizes the access to employment opportunities of type e residents of block i.
15According to the 2015 5-year ACS, around 48% of low-skilled households in Cook County lived in their own
home, compared to 61.4% for high-skilled households. This latter group also received a larger amount of rent income.
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Since there is a continuum of agents, by the law of large numbers this probability also corresponds
to the number of type e individuals living in i and working in j (Neij) relative to the total type-e
residents from location i (NRei).
Before productivity shocks are revealed, the expected income of type e residents living in i is:
ȳei = T̃eRMA
1/θe
ei + ϕe, (8)
where T̃e = T
1/θe
e γθe , and γθe is the gamma constant evaluated at 1− 1θe . This expression suggests
that workers receive higher income in locations with better access to jobs, as measured by RMA.
In a first stage, individuals choose their residential location by drawing a vector of iid preference
shocks over locations from a Fréchet distribution with cdf F (vie) = exp{−v−ηeie }. Properties of the
















where γηe is the gamma constant evaluated at 1 − 1ηe . This expression shows that the expected
utility of a type e city dweller depends on the average price of housing, the average expected income
and the average skill-specific amenities received across all locations. Similarly, the probability that





















which also corresponds to the number of type e residents in location i (NRei) relative to the city
total (Ne). This expression suggests that locations with relatively more amenities, lower rents and
higher residential market access are more desirable and attract more residents.
Commuting market clearing requires that the measure of type e workers employed in each
















where FMAej denotes firm market access, which measures the access to type e workers by firms in
location j, and is greater when a location is close from highly populated residential locations. In












Finally, total demand for residential floor space by type e residents is given by:









As expected, demand for housing depends positively on the mass of residents of each type and their
expected income, and negatively on the price of residential floor space in that location.
Amenities
Amenities are an important factor determining residential location choices. For instance, Bayer
et al. (2007) show that households are willing to pay more to live in locations with a high density of
high-skilled workers. On the other hand, residents of locations with more natural amenities, may
prefer lower population densities. I assume that amenities in a location depend on two components:
residential fundamentals and residential externalities. The first one, denoted by bei, captures fea-
tures of physical geography that affects the willingness to live in location i by type-e residents. The
latter, represents how population density of high-skilled residents affect amenities.16 In particular,







where Li denotes land area, and σe controls the relative importance of externalities in overall
residential amenities by type e individuals.
16I assume that both components are skill-specific as recent evidence suggest that different types of workers have
heterogeneous valuation for different types of amenities (Albouy, 2016; Couture and Handbury, 2017).
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4.2 Firms
Firms produce a single final good under perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The
final good is costlessly traded, and is produced using floor space and both types of labor according















corresponds to the effective units of labor force used by firms
in location j and is a CES aggregator over low- and high-skilled workers with an elasticity of
substitution of 11−ρ ; HFj corresponds to commercial floor space; Aj is the block group-specific
productivity, which is exogenous to firms, but endogenous in the model; α = αu + αs denotes the
total labor share, and αe the share of type e labor.
Firms in location j choose the quantity of inputs that maximize their profits, taking wages
(wju, wjs) and commercial real estate prices (rFj) as given. From the first order conditions, the
































Note that labor demand in location j increases when local productivity or the amount of floor space
increase, or when wages decrease. Finally, using the zero profit condition, I derive the equilibrium
price of commercial floor space in location j, which shows that firms are able to pay higher rents


























I assume that local productivity depends on two components: (i) production fundamentals
from location j (aj), and (ii) production externalities of both types of workers, as captured by their









where NFuj/Lj and N
F
sj/Lj correspond to employment density of low- and high-skilled workers in
location j, respectively; and δu and δs control the relative importance of skill-specific externalities
on determining productivity.
4.3 Real Estate Market with LUR
Based on the canonical models of housing in Muth (1969) and Fujita (1989), I present a simple
model of the real estate market with, with developers and LUR. In order to produce floor space,
developers use capital and land with a production technology that exhibits constant returns to
scale. Furthermore, assume that the owners of capital do not live in the city and that the price of
capital is determined in a national market and normalized to one.
Total demand for residential and commercial floor space in every block group is given by the
solutions of the residents’ and firms’ optimization problems. Given these assumptions, in a world
with no LUR, developers would build floor space for the group of agents (residents or firms) with
the highest willingness to pay, until the price of commercial and residential floor space equalize.18
Rent equalization leads to an optimal distribution of land between residential and commercial uses.
However, when city authorities regulate the use of land, the price of both types of floor space could
differ in equilibrium, and these depend on local demand conditions and LUR.
To incorporate these forces into the model, consider a Zoning Ordinance given by the matrix
Z ∈ {ωR, ωF , ωM , λ, h̄R, h̄F , h̄M}, where ωT is a vector containing the shares of land that can be used
for type T space (residential, mixed-use, commercial) in every block group, with ωRi+ωMi+ωFi = 1;
17The standard interpretation of these externalities is that density facilitates knowledge spillovers, input sharing
or labor market pooling. See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a detailed review on agglomeration economies.
18This is the implicit assumption in recent quantitative models, such as Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Tsivanidis (2019).
These models include a residual that rationalizes price differences.
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λ corresponds to the allowed share of residential space within each block group’s mixed-use districts;
and h̄T denotes the maximum allowed FAR for type T structures. Assuming that land in a block
group is fixed and can be divided between uses, a representative developer chooses the level of
capital that maximizes his profits given the price of land in block i (pi) and subject to LUR. In
residential and commercial districts, his problem is given by:
max
Ki





≤ h̄T i for T ∈ {R,F},






approximates the unconstrained FAR. The
vector νT i denotes the productivity of developers in block i for type-T space. This term accounts for
all the unobserved factors (including other regulations) that affect construction of either residential
or commercial floor space in a location. In mixed-use districts, the developer solves:
max
Ki






The solutions from these problems, together with the zero profit conditions, yield the total
supply of residential and commercial floor space, and the price of land in block group i. In particular














ωT ipT i with pT i = h̄T i
[












T i , (22)
where T ∈ {R,M,F}; λi = 1 when T = R and λi = 0 when T = F ; and χT i denotes the
Lagrangian multiplier from the optimization problem. This multiplier represents the shadow costs
of FAR restrictions (i.e., the marginal profits of relaxing them), and its solution comes from the
first order and the complementary slackness conditions. Floor space market clearing must satisfy
that total demand equals total supply for each type of space T in every block group i.
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4.3.1 Equilibrium with LUR
Given the model’s parameters {{βe, θe, ηe, T̃e, σe, δe}e∈{u,s}, κ, α, ρ, µ}, exogenous location-specific
characteristics {bu,bs,a, τ ,αs,L,νR,νF }, the city wide total population by skill-type {Nu, Ns}
and zoning code Z = {ωR, ωM , ωF , λ, h̄R, h̄M , h̄F }, the general equilibrium of the model is given
by the vectors {{NRe,NFe,we}e∈{u,s}, rR, rF,pR,pF,pM,χR,χF ,χM }, the city-wide expected
utility for both types of workers {ūu, ūs} and transfers from the rents of land {ϕu, ϕs}, such that
both types of workers maximize their utility given their budget constraint, firms maximize their
profits, developers maximize their profits subject to zoning and FAR restrictions, there are zero
profits in the good and real estate markets, markets clear, and block group level working and
residential population add up to the city totals.
In particular, the equilibrium is determined by a system of 13 equations: expected utility (9),
residential choice probabilities (10), labor supply (11), optimal substitution between high- and
low-skilled workers (15), zero profits in the market for the final good (17), residential floor space
market clearing ((19) and (13) for both skill types), commercial floor space market clearing ((20)
and (16)), zero profits in real estate markets (21), and the shadow costs of FAR restrictions (22).19
5 Calibration
In this section, I show how to recover the model’s unobservable variables using block group level
data on real estate prices, LUR and skill-composition, and given values for the different parameters.
I build on the methodologies from Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Tsivanidis (2019) to recover unobserved
wages, amenities and productivities. Afterward, I solve for the real estate market equilibrium with
LUR, and recover the price of land and the shadow price of FAR in each block group. Finally, I
present some calibration results.
19If amenities and productivities were exogenous, the competitive equilibrium would be efficient, conditional on
the zoning ordinance. In the case of endogenous externalities, the competitive equilibrium will not necessarily be
efficient and multiple equilibria are possible. Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) show that in this family of models, there exist
unique vectors of unobserved location characteristics that are consistent with the data being an equilibrium, given
values for parameters and observed data on real estate prices, commuting and residential and workplace population.
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5.1 Market Access, Wages and Productivity
Given parameters {θs, θs, κ}, data on the skill composition of residential and work block groups
({NFu,NFs,NRu,NRs}), and bilateral commuting times ({τ}), commuting market clearing condi-
tions provide the system of equations from (12) that can be solved for residential and firm market
access for each skill-type. Using the recovered measures of RMA and FMA, I use equation (11) to
recover a measure of skill-specific wages for every location.20
Afterward, using the firm’s first order and zero profit conditions, it is possible to derive an














ei e ∈ {u, s},
where ϑei = (weiNFei)/(
∑
e′ wie′NFe′i) corresponds to the labor expenditure share on type e workers
in block group i. Since productivity is assumed to be Hicks-neutral, then Aiu = Ais. For this
equality to hold, I assume that the labor share of low- and high-skilled labor also vary across block
groups in the city, i.e., αuj and αsj and αuj + αsj = α. Normalizing to a geometric mean of 1, the
previous equation can be written as:








ei e ∈ {u, s}, (23)
where the tilde above a variable denotes that is has been normalized. These equations imply
that, given parameters {α, ρ}, observed data {NFu,NFs, rF}, and recovered wages {wu,ws}, I can
determine unique vectors of block group level productivity {A} and measures of the intensity in
which different types of workers are used {αu,αs}.
5.2 Real Estate Market
Having recovered block group level measures of productivity, wages and skill-specific labor shares,
and given data {NFu,NFs,NRu,NRs, rF, rR,Z} and parameters {βu, βs, θu, θs, α, ρ, µ, T̃u, T̃s}, I
20Since the equilibrium system is only defined to scale, I normalize the geometric mean of wages to one. Using the
normalized value of wages, I re-scale the measures of RMA and FMA to be consistent with this choice of units.
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solve for the real estate market equilibrium {p,νR,νF ,χ, ϕu, ϕs} using the following procedure:
1. Set ϕu = ϕ
0
u, ϕs = ϕ
0
s;
2. Solve for νR and νF using the floor space market clearing conditions;
3. Find prices {pT}, with T ∈ {R,M,F} using developers’ zero profit conditions (equation (21)),
and pi =
∑
T ωT ipT i;









5. If ϕ̄u = ϕ
0
u and ϕ̄s = ϕ
0
s, continue to 6; else, update ϕ
1
e = ζϕ̄e + (1− ζ)ϕ0e ∀e, and repeat 2-5
until convergence;
6. Find Lagrange multipliers {χT }, T ∈ {R,M,F} (equation (22)), and χi =
∑
T ωT iχT i.
I set the initial values ϕ0u = 5.38 and ϕ
0
s = 8.10, which correspond to the average ratio of housing
value plus housing income relative to the total household wage income in Cook County according
to the 2015 ACS.21 Step 4 comes from the fact that total payments to households have to equal




For each skill type e, given parameters {θe, βe, ηe, T̃e}, observed data {NRe, rR} and recovered
measures of residential market access and land rents {RMAe, ϕe}, I recover block group skill-







1−βe ˜̄y−1ei , (24)
where yei is the expected income from equation (8). Note that equations (23) and (24) are similar
to those determining the spatial equilibrium in Rosen-Roback type of models (Roback, 1982), where
amenities and productivity are determined by labor market opportunities and local housing prices.
21I define housing income as the income households obtain from rent plus 1% of the value of their properties.
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5.4 Welfare
Given data on {rR, B̃e,RMAe} and parameters {βe, θe, ηe, ϕe, T̃e} for each type of worker, I can
















I can also recover the semi-elasticity of welfare of type e residents with respect to a policy change
in a block group i. Let ξi be a specific LUR inside i (either zoning or FAR). From the previous

















where εrRi,ξi , επRsi,ξi , εRMAei,ξi and εpi,ξi correspond to the respective semi-elasticities of housing
prices, spatial concentration of high-skilled residents, land prices and RMA with respect to the
change in policy ξi. The previous expression suggests that the effect of a policy change on welfare
of type e residents can be decomposed into four components: (i) changes in housing prices, (ii)
changes in sorting patterns (that affect amenities), (iii) changes in wages (as summarized by RMA),
and (iv) changes in the income coming from the rents of land. For the empirical implementation
of this expression, I use the semi-elasticities estimated in equations (2) and (3), together with the
calibration method proposed previously.
5.5 Parameters
In this subsection, I show the source of the different parameters needed to successfully recover the
model’s unobservables and quantify the policy counterfactuals. The parameters {κ, ρ, α, ηu, ηs} are
calibrated to existing values from the literature. First, I set the dis-utility of commuting κ = 0.01
based on Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). Second, I set the elasticity of substitution between high- and
low-skilled workers 11−ρ = 1.5 based on estimates from Ciccone and Peri (2005). Third, I set the
cost share of commercial floor space to 1 − α = 0.156 based on the share of structures in value
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added found in Greenwood et al. (1997) for the US. Finally, I used the estimates of ηu = 2.959 and
ηs = 3.329 from Tsivanidis (2019) for the Fréchet shape parameters of the distribution of shocks
over residential locations.
Housing expenditure shares {1−βu, 1−βs} are calibrated using the 2015 ACS for Cook County
as the average share of housing expenditures for all households within skill groups. This share
is calculated as the ratio between annual housing costs (owning plus renting costs) and the total
household income. These shares correspond to 1 − βu = 0.360 1 − βs = 0.268. The cost share of
land in the production of real estate µ is calibrated using the average land shares of property value
across census tracts in Cook County estimated by Davis et al. (2019): µ = 0.256.
The Fréchet shape parameters from the workers’ match-productivity distribution {θu, θs} are
identified using a gravity approach, given a value for κ. In particular, the log version of equation (7)
provides a gravity equation relating travel time between locations to commuting flows:
lnπj|ie = ζ0,ie + ζ1,je − θeκτij + εije
where ζ0,ie and ζ1,je correspond to origin and destination fixed effects, and εije is an unobserved
error term. Since the commuting matrix between block groups is considerably sparse, I estimate
this equation using flows between census tracts.22 Furthermore, given that the LODES data do
not contain commuting flows by skill, I estimate this equation using flows for low- and high-wage
workers. Table 6 shows the results of these regressions, which indicate that low-wage workers are
more sensitive to commuting, both when travel times or distances are considered.
To build skill-specific estimates, I average the estimates from Columns (1) and (2) using as
weights the average share of low- and high-wage residents by skill category across block groups in
Cook County.23 Using κ = 0.01, I obtain θu = 4.33 and θs = 4.08, indicating a larger dispersion in
the productivity of high-skilled workers. Even though these estimates are not necessarily causal,
they lie between the estimates from Tsivanidis (2019)—who finds θu = 3.30 and θs = 2.72 for
Bogotá— and Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)—who find θ = 6.83 for Berlin.
22Around 91.6% of block groups pairs have zero commuters. This share decreases to 66% between tract. Implica-
tions of granularity in spatial models are discussed in Dingel and Tintelnot (2021).
23Among low-skilled, the share of low-wage workers is 0.577. Among high-skilled, the share is 0.401.
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Table 6: Gravity Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Wage High Wage Low Wage High Wage




R-squared 0.396 0.426 0.387 0.421
Observations 1,737,124
Notes: This table shows the results of OLS regressions on the log conditional commuting shares by income level on
travel times and distance between census tracts in 2015-2016 in Cook County. Regressions include tract of origin and
of destination fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p. <0.1.
I calibrate the scale parameters of the match-productivity Fréchet distribution using the method
proposed by Tsivanidis (2019). In particular, after normalizing T̃u = 1, I calibrate T̃s “so that the
aggregate wage skill premium in the model matches that observed in the data” (Tsivanidis, 2019).









, where 1.92 is the ratio
between the average hourly wage of high- and low-skilled workers from the 2015 ACS.
Finally, I estimate the agglomeration parameters using the log versions of equations (14) and


















where the variables in the left-hand side correspond to the amenities and productivities recovered
in Sections 5.1 and 5.3. From these regressions, I also recover the residential and production
agglomeration fundamentals ({bui, bsi, ai}) for every block group. In Table 7, I present the estimated
agglomeration parameters. Estimates from Columns (1) and (2) show a similar effect of density on
skill-specific amenities: a 1% increase in the density of high-skilled residents leads to an amenity
increase of 0.4% for both types of residents. Column (3) shows that high- and low-skilled worker
densities have different effects on productivity. While, a 1% increase in the density of high-skilled
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workers leads to a 0.26% increase in block group productivity, a similar increase in the density of
low-skilled workers seems to cause a reduction of 0.04%. These estimates suggest that the benefits
from concentrating high-skilled workers in certain locations in Chicago (e.g., knowledge spillovers)
outweigh their costs (e.g., congestion), but the costs are slightly larger for low-skilled workers.
However, these estimates should be interpreted with caution as the first stage F-test could suggest
a weak instrument problem.
Table 7: Agglomeration Parameters
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Amenities Ln Produc-
Low Sk High Sk tivity
Ln.Density High 0.398*** 0.403***





F-Test 8.20 8.20 0.78
Observations 1,420 1,420 1,336
Notes: This table shows the results of 2SLS regressions of the effects of resident and worker density on measures of
skill-specific amenities and productivity. The estimations use the 1923 zoning ordinance as instrument and include
controls for block group’s land area, distance to the CBD and to major waterways, transit access, and historical
covariates. The dependent variables were recovered using the quantitative model. Spatial Heteroscedasticity and
Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.001.
5.6 Calibration Results
In this section, I present a brief description of the variables recovered using the calibration method
presented in the previous section. Table A5 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics of the
different variables recovered with the model.
In Figure 4, I present the geographic distribution of land prices (Left Panel) and shadow costs
of FAR restrictions (Panel B) in Cook County. The maps show that land is most expensive around
the CBD and along the coast of Lake Michigan, particularly north of downtown. Moreover, the
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shadow costs of FAR restrictions are also relatively high north of downtown, but also in some block
groups in the west, particularly around O’Hare airport. These values suggest that the city could
benefit from relaxing FAR restrictions in these block groups relative to other locations. From the
calibration procedure, I also obtain values for the transfers that residents receive from the rents of
land: ϕu = 4.20 and ϕs = 6.32, which indicate that high-skilled residents received 50% more land
rents than low-skilled residents.
Figure 4: Price of Land and Shadow Cost of Regulations in Cook County, 2015-2016
Notes: This figure shows land prices and costs of FAR restrictions in every block group in Cook County for the
period 2015-2016. Both variables are recovered using the quantitative model. Blue dot represents Chicago’s CBD.
In Figures A6 and A7 in the Appendix, I show the geographic distribution of amenities and
productivities across block groups. The distribution of amenities is quite similar for high- and
low-skilled residents, suggesting that both have similar tastes regarding residential amenities. In
addition, local productivity is higher around the CBD.24 Regarding welfare, Table A6 shows the
average expected utility for a type e resident in Cook County. I compute this measure with and
24There is also a high and significant correlation between productivity and commercial real estate prices (0.42),
and the share of land zoned for commercial only uses (0.48).
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without the income from land rents. In both cases, welfare is higher for high-skilled relative to low-
skilled residents, but the gap between both groups is larger when transfers from land are allowed.
Finally, to test the fitness of the model, I explore the relationship between land prices recovered
by my model and land prices estimated by Davis et al. (2019) for Cook County. The latter estimates
land prices for all Census tracts in the United States using different data, model and methods than
the ones from this paper. Both set of land prices have a coefficient of correlation of 0.70, which
is significant at the 99%, suggesting a strong relation between them and a good fit of the model
predicting land prices. In Figure 5, I present the scatter plot between both estimated land prices,
where the clear positive relationship between both is evident.
Figure 5: Model Fit—Price of Land: Model vs. Davis et al. (2019)
Notes: This figure shows a scatterplot and the regression line between the logarithm of the land prices predicted by
the quantitative model and the logarithm of the land prices estimated by Davis et al. (2019). Since prices from Davis
et al. (2019) are at the tract level, I aggregate my model’s recovered prices using a weighted sum of the block group
prices, where the weights are the block group’s area share within its tract.
6 The Incidence of Land Use Regulations
I now explore the effect of zoning and FAR restrictions on the recovered measures of wages, ameni-
ties, productivity and land prices. In particular, I follow the same empirical strategy from Section 3,
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in which I estimate 2SLS regressions of these outcomes on current zoning and FAR regulations using
the 1923 Chicago Zoning Ordinance districts as instruments. Afterward, I quantify welfare under
four different counterfactual scenarios to study how welfare and welfare inequality change when
there are large changes in LUR.
6.1 LUR and Wages
We start by exploring the relationship between LUR and wages. The 2SLS estimates suggest that
a 10pp increase in the share of land zoned for residential-only uses leads to a decrease of 5.8% in
the wage of low-skilled workers and of 5.4% for high-skilled workers. However, a similar increase
in the share of mixed-use designations leads to a wage increase of 2.6% for both types of workers.
Regarding FAR restrictions, an increase of one-unit in the allowed FAR in a particular block group,
leads to a 19% increase in the wages of both types. I present these estimates in Columns (1) and (2)
from Table 8. These results validate earlier results from Table 5: more stringent LUR in a location
leads to lower wages. Our model suggests that, this result comes as firms respond to higher real
estate prices (brought by tighter regulations) by adjusting their wages down.25
6.2 LUR, Amenities and Productivity
Results from Table 8 also suggest that more stringent LUR lead to higher residential amenities.
In particular, estimates from Columns (3) and (4) from Panel A show that a 10pp increase in the
share of land zoned for residential-only uses leads to an increase of around 2.5% in local amenities,
relative to block groups with more commercial zoning. In addition, a one-unit increase in the
allowed FAR leads to a 3% reduction in amenities. Nonetheless, a 10pp increase in the share of
mixed-use designations leads to a 1% reduction in amenities. These effects are not significantly
different for high- and low-skilled residents, suggesting that amenities generated by LUR are valued
similarly by both skill types.26
25I also explore the effect of LUR on residential and firm market access. Results show that an increase in the
share of mixed-use designations leads to a larger increase in RMA and FMA than a similar increase in any other
designation, suggesting that both firms and workers benefit when regulation lets them locate close to each other.
These results are available on request.
26Recall that in the quantitative model, amenities are generated by the sorting of high-skilled residents into a
neighborhood, and that agglomeration estimates from Table 7 are statistically equal.
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Table 8: Effects of LUR on Model’s Unobservables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln Wages Ln Amenities Ln Pro-. Ln Price Ln. Shadow
Low Sk High Sk Low Sk High Sk ductivity Land Price
Panel A
Sh. Res. Only -0.60*** -0.56*** 0.26*** 0.24*** -0.52*** 2.64*** 4.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sh. Mixed-uses 0.26*** 0.26*** -0.09*** -0.11*** 0.24*** 3.41*** 4.31***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
F-Test 12.11 12.21 12.06 12.06 14.62 12.89 12.89
Panel B
Mean FAR 0.19*** 0.19*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.18*** -0.35*** -0.73***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
F-Test 20.14 20.82 18.48 18.48 20.85 20.42 20.42
Observations 1,389 1,389 1,420 1,420 1,336 1,427 1,427
Notes: This table shows the results of 2SLS regressions of the effects of different LUR measures on measures of wages,
amenities, productivity, price of land and the shadow price of FAR restrictions by block group. The estimations use
the 1923 zoning ordinance as instrument and include controls for block group’s land area, distance to the CBD and
to major waterways, transit access, and historical covariates. The dependent variables are in logs and were recovered
using the quantitative model from Section 4. Spatial Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (SHAC)
standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p. <0.1.
Zoning and FAR restrictions also have sizable effects on local productivity. Specifically, a
10pp increase in the share of land zoned for residential-only uses leads to a 5.1% decrease in local
productivity, relative to block groups with more commercial zoning. A similar increase in mixed-
use designations leads to a productivity increase of 2.4%, while a one-unit increase in allowed FAR
results in an 18% increase. Two forces are behind these results. First, recall that more mixed-
use designations and increases in allowed FAR lead to higher spatial concentration of workers.
This concentration generates knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling and/or input-out sharing,
leading to productivity gains (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Second, more mixed-use designations
also lead to increases in the spatial concentration of residents, which affects local productivity
through increases in wages and firm market access.
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6.3 LUR, Price of Land and Stringency
Finally, I estimate the effect of LUR on land prices and the shadow price of FAR limits. Estimates
from Column (6) suggest that more stringent regulation leads to increases in local land prices. In
particular, a 10pp increase in the share of land zoned for residential-only uses leads to an increase
of 30.2% in the price of land, relative to block groups with more commercial zoning. Moreover, a
one-unit decrease in the allowed FAR, leads to a 35% increase in prices. These results are in line
with research studying the home-voter hypothesis, such as Fischel (2001), who suggest that land
and home owners benefit from tighter LUR as it increases the value of their properties. Nonetheless,
and perhaps surprising, a higher share of land zoned for mixed-uses leads to a 40.6% increase in
land prices.
Following the framework proposed by Brueckner et al. (2017), I use results from Column (6) to
study the stringency of FAR. In particular, the authors suggest that if the coefficient accompanying
allowed FAR from a regression on land prices is positive, the existing limit is stringent. Thus, the
negative coefficient from Column (6) could suggest that on average, FAR restrictions in Chicago are
not too stringent, which lies in line with estimates from Brueckner and Singh (2020). On the other
hand, this framework, applied to results from Panel A, suggests that current zoning regulations are
quite stringent. An alternative way to study stringency is by analyzing the effect of FAR on their
shadow prices. Recall that these prices represent the profits developers fail to receive due to FAR
restrictions. Estimates from Panel B from Column (7) suggest that relaxing allowed FAR limits
by one-unit lead to a 73% decrease of the local shadow price of FAR. Hence, they suggest that on
average, FAR restrictions in Chicago are binding and quite stringent.27
6.4 LUR and Welfare
In this final subsection, I study how the welfare of both types of residents and welfare inequality
change when there is a discrete change in LUR. I do this by simulating four different counterfactual
scenarios in which I use the semi-elasticities of real estate prices (from Table 3) and the distribution
27Results from Panel A suggest that increasing residential zoning would lead to higher shadow prices, as residential
areas tend to have lower FAR.
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of skills (from Table 4) with respect to changes in LUR, together with the solution from Section 5.
Furthermore, as described in Section 5.4, I decompose the total change in welfare induced by the
policies into four mechanisms: changes in housing prices, changes in amenities brought by sorting,
changes in residential market access and changes in the land rent income.
First, consider a policy that attempts to eliminate some of the inefficiencies of current zoning.
In particular, I (i) increase the share of land zoned for residential purposes in those block groups
where residential real estate is significantly more expensive, and (ii) increase the share of land zoned
for commercial purposes where commercial prices are higher.28 This policy would affect 68% of
block groups. In Panel A from Table 9, I present the change in welfare brought by this policy,
with respect to the baseline results from Table A6. Columns (2)-(5) show the changes when each
one of the mechanisms affecting welfare is set to zero. The results suggest welfare gains of around
5.35% for low-skilled residents, a slight decrease of -0.05% for high-skilled residents and a decrease
in welfare inequality between both. The decomposition shows that: (i) most of the welfare gains of
low-skilled residents come from changes in amenities, while decreases in RMA contribute negatively
to it; (ii) high-skilled residents are negatively affected by changes in amenities, but that effect is
compensated by lower housing prices and a higher income from the rents of land.
In a second exercise, I increase FAR limits by 0.5 in the block groups from the top decile of the
shadow price distribution, that is, in those locations where FAR limits are most constrained. In this
scenario (Panel B), welfare increases by 3.84% for low-skilled residents, decreases by 0.31% for high-
skilled, hence, welfare inequality decreases. For both types, changes in housing prices do not affect
their welfare, but changes in RMA affect it negatively. Specifically, if RMA did not change due to
this policy, welfare would increase by 7% and 1.5% for low- and high-skilled residents, respectively.
On the other hand, if it were not for changes in amenities, welfare would decrease. Finally, notice
that high-skilled residents are partially compensated with higher rents of land. Third, I simulate
a policy that imposes a minimum allowed FAR of 1.2 everywhere in Chicago. This policy would
affect 1022 block groups (47%). In this scenario, there would be an increase of around 5.23% in
the welfare of low-skilled residents, a decrease of 0.2% for high-skilled residents and a decrease in
28In particular, in block groups where the gap between residential and commercial prices is more than 1.1, this
simulated policy converts up to 10% of commercial-zoned land into residential-zoned land, and vice versa.
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Table 9: Changes in Welfare - Counterfactuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Towards an Optimum Zoning
Total Change ∆Prices=0 ∆Sorting=0 ∆RMA=0 ∆LandInc=0
Welfare Low-Skilled 5.35% 5.28% 0.32% 5.61% 5.06%
Welfare High-Skilled -0.05% -0.09% 0.29% 0.02% -0.34%
Relative Welfare -0.055
Panel B: ∆FAR = 0.5 if block in top decile of χi
Total Change ∆Prices=0 ∆Sorting=0 ∆RMA=0 ∆LandInc=0
Welfare Low-Skilled 3.84% 3.82% -1.15% 6.98% 2.30%
Welfare High-Skilled -0.31% -0.32% -0.19% 1.45% -1.88%
Relative Welfare -0.042
Panel C: Minimum FAR of 1.2
Total Change ∆Prices=0 ∆Sorting=0 ∆RMA=0 ∆LandInc=0
Welfare Low-Skilled 5.23% 5.18% 0.09% 5.45% 5.17%
Welfare High-Skilled -0.20% -0.24% 0.04% -0.14% -0.26%
Relative Welfare -0.055
Panel D: At least 25% Mixed-Use Zoning
Total Change ∆Prices=0 ∆Sorting=0 ∆RMA=0 ∆LandInc=0
Welfare Low-Skilled 4.87% 3.77% 0.66% 6.47% 4.48%
Welfare High-Skilled 0.02% -0.80% 0.65% 0.64% -0.38%
Relative Welfare -0.050
Notes: This table shows the changes in the expected utility by skill level in Chicago with respect to the baseline
welfare levels from Table A6 and based on the counterfactual exercises described in the text, together with the welfare
change when each one of the mechanisms is set to zero. These four mechanisms correspond to (i) changes in housing
prices; (ii) changes in amenities brought by changes in sorting; (iii) changes in residential market access; and (iv)
changes in the income coming from the rents of land.
welfare inequality.
Fourth, given the large reductions in housing prices resulting from increases in mixed-use zon-
ing, I simulate a policy that designates for mixed-uses at least 25% of every block group’s land
area, affecting 1750 block groups (80%).29 In this case (Panel D), welfare increases by 4.87% for
low-skilled and by 0.02% for high-skilled residents, and welfare inequality decreases. For the lat-
ter group, changes in sorting and RMA contribute negatively to their welfare, but this effect is
compensated almost perfectly by lower housing prices and larger rents from land. For low-skilled
29On average, 78% of the land of these block groups was zoned for residential uses and 11% for commercial uses.
In addition, I assume that the share of residential floor space within each block group’s mixed-use districts remains
constant after the policy change.
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residents, most of their welfare gains come from changes in amenities induced by sorting.
Three important conclusions arise from these results. First, the current zoning ordinance is a
regressive policy that benefits high-skilled residents more. Second, LUR can be modified to reduce
welfare inequality between types of residents. In particular, the four simulated policies yielded
similar welfare changes and a similar reduction in welfare inequality. Third, transfers from the rents
of land play an important role in determining welfare gains, especially for high-skilled residents.
Specifically, results suggest that if homeownership was non-existent, high-skilled residents would
be worse off by any change in LUR, but land rents compensate their welfare losses from the other
channels.
7 Conclusions
Land use regulations (LUR) shape the daily life of hundreds of millions of urban dwellers around
the world. Local governments use different tools, such as zoning restrictions, floor-to-area ratio
limits, lot size restrictions, etc., to regulate the use of land. While there is substantial research on
the effects of these tools on housing markets, segregation and other outcomes, less empirical work
has been done assessing their general equilibrium effects and their impact on welfare and welfare
inequality between different types of residents.
This paper investigates the effects of zoning (permitted uses) and FAR restrictions on a wide
range of block group level outcomes, the welfare of high- and low-skilled people and welfare in-
equality. Using detailed geographic data for Cook County and the City of Chicago in 2015-2016, I
start by studying the effect of current zoning and FAR restrictions on the real estate market and
sorting by skill across block groups. For identification, I use the 1923 Zoning Ordinance, which
was the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in Chicago. I find that an increase of 10 percentage
points in the share of land designated for mixed-uses, leads to a 5.4% decrease in housing prices,
and a decrease in the share of high-skilled residents in that block group.
Afterwards, I build a quantitative model of a city with two types of workers. The inclusion
of individual heterogeneity in the model is important since zoning is often considered a regressive
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measure. Thus, the inclusion of two types of residents allows me to study the distributional effects
of LUR. In the model, I also include microfoundations of a real estate market, in which developers
face zoning and FAR restrictions, and supply residential and commercial floor space. The model
allows me to decompose the welfare effect of LUR into four components: changes in housing prices,
amenities, wages and the income from land rents.
Together with data and parameter values, this model allows me to recover measures of wages,
amenities, productivities and land prices for all locations, and study how regulations affect them.
Among other results, I find that more residential zoning and lower FAR limits lead to a decrease in
local wages and productivity. However, more residential zoning also leads to a significant increase
in local amenities through its effect on the sorting of high-skilled residents.
Counterfactual exercises suggest an important welfare-enhancing role of large changes in current
regulations, as well as their role in reducing welfare inequality. In particular, I simulate the welfare
effects of four policies. First, a policy that allows more residential zoning in block groups displaying
an excess relative demand of residential real estate. Second, a policy that increases FAR limits by
0.5 in those block groups where the constraint binds the most. Third, a policy that sets a minimum
FAR of 1.2 everywhere in Chicago. Fourth, a policy that sets a minimum of 25% of land zoned
for mixed-uses in each block group. All of these policies lead to similar welfare improvements of
low-skilled residents, and a decrease in the welfare gap between skill types.
These results yield three important conclusions. First, the current zoning ordinance is a re-
gressive policy. Second, LUR could be modified to reduce welfare inequality between residents.
Third, transfers from the rents of land play an important role in determining welfare, especially for
high-skilled residents. Specifically, if homeownership was non-existent, high-skilled residents would
be worse off with any change in LUR, but transfers from the rents of lands compensate their welfare
losses coming from other channels.
Lastly, note that this paper excludes other possible forces affecting sorting and urban devel-
opment. For instance, I do not consider a wide range of fiscal issues, such as Tiebout sorting, in
which small jurisdictions set their policies strategically (Epple and Sieg, 1999; Parkhomenko, 2020).
Moreover, I do not take into account dynamic considerations, which are important in the study of
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real estate markets, both in the demand and supply sides (Bayer et al., 2016; Murphy, 2018). All
of these issues are left for future research.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Real Estate Prices
I use data of real estate prices and stocks from Zillow Economic Research. The Zillow ZTRAX data
sets contains real estate transactions for around 3,000 counties in the United States. These data
are constructed from information in local deed transfers and mortgages for mostly residential prop-
erties, but also include commercial properties in the more recent years and in larger metropolitan
areas.(Zillow, 2017).30 Among other variables, these data include sales price, transaction date and
coordinates of the property. I merge this dataset with assessment data collected by Zillow, which
include property characteristics, geographic information, current and prior valuations.31
Using the ZTRAX transactions and assessment data, I build quality-adjusted residential and
commercial real estate price indices for each census block group in Cook County in the period
2015-2016.32 For the construction of these indices, I drop governmental, institutional, historical,
communication, recreational, miscellaneous and transportation properties, group quarters, trailer
parks and parking garages. Moreover, I use only arm’s length transactions, drop those with a
sales price below 10,000 USD, and drop census block groups with fewer than 4 transactions. After
imposing these restrictions, I estimate the following hedonic regression:33
ln(Phim,T ) = Xhim,Tβ + ln(rT i) + δm + εhim,T ,
where ln(Phim,T ) denotes the log sale price of a property h of type T (residential R or commercial
F ) in a census block group i sold in month m; Xhim,T represents a vector of property characteristics;
ln(rT i) denote census block group fixed effects; and δm are month of sale fixed effects, which account
30Data provided by Zillow through the Zillow Transaction and Assessment Dataset (ZTRAX). More information
on accessing the data can be found at http://www.zillow.com/ztrax. The results and opinions are those of the author
and do not reflect the position of Zillow Group.
31Baum-Snow and Han (2019) use these data for the whole United States and compare their tract-level price and
stock indices with similar measures built using Census data. They find that the correlation between both prices
indices is rather low, but generate similar estimates of housing supply elasticities. However, the flow and stock of
units generated by both data are quite similar and highly correlated.
32A block group is the US Census classification lying between a tract and a block. There are 809 tracts in Chicago
containing on average 2.7 block groups, and there are 2,194 block groups containing on average 17 blocks.
33Alternatively, I could use a repeated sales approach. However, since data for commercial transactions are only
available in the latter years (2014 to 2016), it is not possible to compute such an index for commercial real estate.
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for the seasonality of the real estate market. The vector of characteristics includes a polynomial
of degree two of age and size, and other discrete categories, such as number of rooms, bathrooms,
flooring, roofing, fireplace, condition and type of property (e.g., single-detached, townhouse, etc.,
for residential, or office, retail, industrial, etc., for commercial properties).
The estimated block group fixed effects capture the average quality-adjusted log price of type
T ∈ {R,F} in all block groups. The residential price index (rRi) covers around 97% of all block
groups in my sample between 2015-2016, while the commercial price index (rFi) has a coverage of
43%. To increase coverage, I use an inverse distance weighted interpolation for those block groups
with missing price indices. For those blocks where the missing value persists, I use the mean
within the block group’s census tract. These imputations raise the coverage of the residential and
commercial price indices to 99.9% and to 97.5%, respectively. Since these prices are identified up
to scale, I normalize their geometric mean to 1.
Figure A1 presents the distribution of real estate prices across block groups in Cook County,
and Table A1 presents descriptive statistics for these indices. The most expensive residential real
estate in the county in 2015-2016 was found in the blocks surrounding the CBD, as well as the area
north of downtown. On the other hand, the cheapest areas are located in the south part of the city
and west of downtown. For commercial real estate, the patterns are similar, but less smooth, with
high commercial prices in the CBD and along the northern coast. Comparing both indices, I find
that the distribution of commercial real estate prices is significantly more skewed, with 5.4% of the
block groups having commercial real estate more expensive than any block group’s residential real
estate.
I also use the assessment data to measure the stock of residential and commercial floor space
in each block group as the sum of the built square footage of all properties within type. Figure A2
shows that the block groups with the largest amount of residential space are located downtown and
in the suburbs, while the stock of commercial real estate is concentrated downtown, along the main
avenues and in the suburbs.
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A.2 Land Use Regulations in Chicago
The data on land use and its regulations comes from two sources. First, from the Data Portal
of the City of Chicago, which contains a geographic database of all the zoning districts within
city boundaries. The zoning data contain coordinates and specific zone class categories for 2016.
The detailed specifications of each zone class are available in the Chicago Zoning and Land Use
Ordinances (City of Chicago, 2019). In total, there are 66 zone classes, 15 Planned Manufacturing
Developments (PMD) and more than a thousand Planned Developments (PD) within the city. An
example of zone class is RS-3, which corresponds to a detached, single family home in a Residential
Single-Unit District, with a maximum FAR of 0.9, a maximum height of 30 feet and a minimum
lot size of 2500 square feet, with no commercial activity allowed.
Out of the total land area in Chicago, around 52% is currently categorized as residential (R),
while manufacturing (M), commercial (C) and business (B) districts use approximately 11%, 3%
and 7%, respectively. Locations categorized as downtown districts (D) use about 1% of the area.
Downtown districts can be Residential (DR), Core (DC), Service (DS) or Mixed-Use (DX) districts.
PMD and PD cover 6% and 12%, respectively. Weighted by their allowed floor-to-area ratio,
these shares correspond to 29% for residential, 15% for manufacturing, 4% for commercial, 9%
for business, 6% for downtown, 11% for PMD and 27% for PD. These differences indicate that
residential districts have relatively low allowed densities compared to any other district.
I group all districts into three categories: those designated for residential purposes only (R
and DR), for commercial only (M, PMD, DS and some C and B) and for mixed-uses (some B,
C, DC and DX). I also categorized each Planned Development into a categories based on their
characteristics. Planned Developments correspond to tall buildings and other large developments
in which developers must work with the City to ensure that the project integrates with surround-
ing neighborhoods (2nd City Zoning, nd). The City of Chicago keeps pdf files for each Planned
Development in https://gisapps.chicago.gov/gisimages/zoning˙pds. PD range from Airports and
Spectator Sports arenas, to mixed-used developments or waterway residential developments. The
complete list of types is available on request. In the left panel of Figure 2, I present a map of the
city using this categorization. In the right panel, I map the maximum FAR allowed in each zoning
50
district. In Figure A3, I present a map of the distribution of all nine broad zoning designations.
Using these maps, I build measures of the share of land designated for residential, mixed-uses
or commercial purposes, and the average allowed FAR in each block group. I also build a measure
of the share of residential space allowed in each block group using the districts’ allowed FAR—as
a proxy for the permitted number of floors—together with details inside the Ordinance regarding
the number of residential stories allowed. I denote this measure as λ.34 This measure is used
calibrating the model as it captures the share of floor space in mixed-use districts that can be used
for residential purposes. The coefficient of correlation between this measure and (i) the share of
land zoned for residential purposes only is 0.75, (ii) the share of land zoned for commercial uses is
-0.89, both significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level.
B Extra Tables and Figures
Table A1: Real Estate Hedonic Price Indices, 2015-2016
(1) (2) (3)
Residential Commercial Ratio R/C
N. Block Groups 3,985 3,890 3,889
Mean 1.36 2.41 1.49
Std. Dev. 1.12 5.07 3.57
Min 0.09 0.00 0.01
Median 1.09 1.01 0.95
Max 12.97 87.79 117.5
Corr with Res HI 1.0 0.41
Corr with Com HI 0.41 1.0
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the residential and commercial hedonic price indices, and for
the ratio between between them. These prices are estimated using a hedonic regression approach for both types of
properties, separately, and an inverse distance weighted interpolation for those locations without enough observations.
Price indices are normalized to a geometric mean or 1.
34For example, B3-3 zoning districts have an allowed FAR of 3, with apartments only permitted above the ground
floor. In this case, I assume that the first floor is used for commercial purposes, while the two remaining floors are
used for residential purposes. Hence, I set λ = 2/3. Moreover, λ = 1 for residential-only districts, and λ = 0 for
commercial-only districts. For Planned Developments, I assumed λ = 0.8 for those categorized as mixed-used.
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Table A2: Average and Median Block Group, 2015-2016
By Block of Residence
Total 30+ <HS HS Some Coll >College
County Mean 416.3 58.0 96.6 123.6 138.2
Median 373 51.5 87.5 111.5 117
Total 1.66m 231k 385k 493k 551k
City Mean 368.1 57.2 86.1 108.6 116.1
Median 332 50.5 79.5 98 89.5
Total 806k 125k 189k 238k 254k
By Block of Work
Total 30+ <HS HS Some Coll >College
County Mean 466.2 60.4 106.1 138.1 161.6
Median 89.5 14.5 23 27 24.5
Total 1.86m 241k 423k 551k 645k
City Mean 463.4 60.2 102.0 135.3 165.9
Median 66 12 17 19.5 16.5
Total 1.02m 132k 224k 296k 363k
Notes: This table shows the number of people by education level in the mean and median block group, by both
residential and workplace block groups, in both Cook County and the City of Chicago. Educational attainment
categories respectively correspond to less than high school, high school or equivalent, some college or associate
degree, bachelor’s degree or advanced degree.
Table A3: Distribution of Workers by Earnings and Skill, 2015-2016
Mean Shares, Block of
Earnings Education Residence Work
Low Low 23.43% 30.86%
High Low 15.62% 10.64%
Low High 23.70% 32.56%
High High 37.25% 23.59%
Notes: This table shows the distribution of workers by earnings and skills in the average block group of residence




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A5: Descriptive Statistics - Recovered Variables
Skill Mean SD Min p50 Max
Residential MA Low 6,319.8 1,134.2 3,017.5 6,354.4 17,141.6
Firm MA Low 39.35 5.77 20.60 40.41 125.59
Wages Low 1.05 0.46 0.00 0.99 5.15
Amenities Low 1.05 0.32 0.00 1.06 2.44
Residential MA High 8,566.8 1,603.5 4,117.4 8,629.9 21,861.7
Firm MA High 54.14 7.43 29.60 54.98 178.4
Wages High 1.08 0.53 0.00 0.99 6.83
Amenities High 1.05 0.33 0.00 1.06 2.36
Productivity 10.37 4.56 0.00 9.69 56.07
Land Prices 3,152.4 23,652 0.00 1719.4 1.44m
Shadow Price 2,586.4 13,208 -2.68 1960.2 0.65m
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for different variables recovered from the quantitative model using the
calibration procedure from Section 5. m indicates millions (1e06).
Table A6: Expected Utility in the City
(1) (2)
Welfare Low-Skilled 277.84 178.20
Welfare High-Skilled 290.55 182.41
Relative Welfare 1.046 1.023
Income from Land YES NO
Notes: This table shows the expected utility by skill type in Cook County recovered from the quantitative model
from Section 5. Column (1) shows the total expected utility, while Column (2) assumes that residents do not receive
any transfer from the rents of land.
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Figure A1: Real Estate Hedonic Prices in Cook County, 2015-2016
Notes: This figure shows the residential (left) and commercial (right) real estate price indices for every block group
in Cook County for the period 2015-2016. These prices are estimated using a hedonic regression approach for both
types of properties, separately, and an inverse distance weighted interpolation for those locations without enough
observations. Price indices are normalized to a geometric mean or 1. Blue dot represents Chicago’s CBD.
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Figure A2: Total Built Square Footage–Cook County, 2015-2016
This figure shows the total stock of residential (left) and commercial (right) real estate for every block group in Cook
County for the period 2015-2016. The stock is computed as the sum of the built square footage of all properties
within type. Blue dot represents Chicago’s CBD.
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Figure A3: Broad Zoning Designations, 2016
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the nine zoning classes in the City of Chicago as indicated by the 2016
Zoning Ordinance. POS denotes Parks and Open Spaces. PMD denotes Planned Manufacturing Districts. PD denote
Planned Developments.
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Figure A4: Distribution of Skills–Cook County, 2015-2016
Notes: The left figure shows the share of high-skilled residents for every block group in Cook County in 2015-2016.
The right figure shows the share of high-skilled workers for every block group in Cook County in 2015-2016. Blue
dot represents Chicago’s CBD.
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Figure A5: Spatial Correlation of Real Estate Prices
Notes: This figure shows the residual covariance of real estate prices across block groups as a function of their
bilateral distance in kilometers. I use residential real estate prices in the left panel and commercial real estate prices
in the right panel. This residual covariance is obtained by bootstrapping the spatial correlation between residual
real estate prices from regressions of real estate prices on land use regulations, including controls for block group’s
land area, distance to the CBD and to major waterways, transit access, and historical covariates. Price measures are
quality adjusted (hedonic).
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Figure A6: Amenities in Cook County, 2015-2016
Notes: This figure shows local residential amenities by skill type for every block group in Cook County for the period
2015-2016. Both variables are recovered using the quantitative model. Blue dot represents Chicago’s CBD.
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Figure A7: Productivity in Cook County, 2015-2016
Notes: This figure shows local productivity for every block group in Cook County for the period 2015-2016. Pro-
ductivity is recovered using the quantitative model. Red dot represents Chicago’s CBD.
61
